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Abstract 
The paper analyzes relevant concepts for command & control effectiveness in the 
German disaster response system. The concepts are derived from legal text review, an 
analogy between military and disaster response domain and interpretations of 
representatives from major German disaster response organizations. The concepts are 
integrated into a conceptual model. 
Keywords: German Disaster Response, Command & Control, Conceptual Model 
 
1 Introduction 
Imagine you stay in Munich for vacation and suddenly there is a black out. Small teams 
of terrorists cut Munich’s three main power supply lines. What happens next? Water 
supply, the traffic network including traffic lights and gas stations, hospitals and the 
whole industrial life including financial activities rely on electricity. This scenario 
illustrates both the complexity of and our vulnerability in that scenario. To protect cities 
like Munich there is a system of disaster management organizations from official 
administration and private companies.  
To allocate and reallocate but also to plan, manage and supervise all disaster response 
capabilities and forces an effective command and control (C2) system able to prepare 
forces and lead them during disasters is necessary. Previous studies on German disaster 
response operations outline that the overall German disaster response system and its C2 
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system work quite well (Kirchbach, Franke, Biele, Minnich, Epple, Schäfer, Unnasch 
and Schuster, 2002; Huber, Richter, Römer and Lechner, 2008; Richter, Huber and 
Lechner, 2009). In a scenario that calls for collaboration of various organizations and 
which requires agility, C2 capabilities are critical. The disaster response system 
undergoes a process of transformation to prepare itself for more complex scenarios as 
terrorist attacks or large-scale natural disasters. Furthermore, we argue that transforming 
the C2 system leverages the effort of transformation, as management in the information 
age is fundamentally different from industrial age (Alberts and Hayes, 2003).  
To understand which concepts play a major role for transforming the C2 system of the 
German disaster management system, we raise three questions of concern. 1) Which 
static organizational structure of German1 disaster response organizations exists and 
how does that structure change in case of disaster? 2) Is the analogy between military 
domain and disaster response domain regarding C2 appropriate? 3) How do deeply 
involved representatives from disaster response organizations interpret influencing 
concepts of C2 in the disaster response system? We integrate the analyzed concepts into 
one coherent conceptual model that describes influence factors on the overall C2 
effectiveness of the German disaster response C2 system.  
We did not explicitly raise the question about e-trust and e-applications for better inter-
organisational C2-collaboration. However, this contribution helps to understand the 
system of disaster response and can be seen as a very first step also for application 
development to support disaster response. 
2 Method 
We adopt an interpretive approach to our object of inquiry – the German disaster 
response system and its C2 system. We are interested in concepts relevant to Germany’s 
disaster management and the intersubjective meanings embedded in the social system 
with its interactions generated by its people (Rosen, 1991). The meanings of things, 
concepts, rules and norms in disaster management organizations arise from people’s 
social interactions and are result of an interpretive process by them (Boland, 1979). To 
understand these interpretations we conducted interviews with managers of Federal and 
Bavarian disaster management organizations. To be able to ask rich questions we 
analysed relevant German and Bavarian legal texts/regulations to understand 
organizational structure of the disaster response system (see Figure 1).  
 
                                                 
1 Actauly we analyze the German disaster response system using the federal state of Bavaria as example 
as all German federal states are self-governed responsible for disaster response and thus not one fully 
integrated German disaster response system exists. 
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Figure 1: Research Method 
A result of the first research phase (Figure 1) is the identification of an analogy between 
design principles of military and disaster response C2 systems. In the second phase we 
researched this analogy more closely. We were interested whether models developed by 
NATO to manage the military transformation process to become more networked to 
cope with complex mission scenarios (BMVg, 2004) are known and adopted by the 
German disaster managers to inform disaster response system transformation. We 
conducted seven semi-structured, problem-focused in-depth interviews (Bortz and 
Döring, 2009; Diekmann, 2009) in six German major disaster management 
organizations with focus on Bavaria during June and July 2009 (Table 1). 
We conducted three interviews at the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster 
Assistance (BBK), a Federal Ministry of the Interior office, responsible to support the 
Federal Government in all questions of disaster response and to support federal states in 
disaster management operations when states requesting coordination support. The BBK 
is also responsible for standardization in disaster response education and training. As 
Table 1 depicts, the three BBK-interviews were conducted in different sections of BBK. 
Interview BBK was conducted in the section responsible for overall disaster response 
and its future development. Interview deNIS took place with the head of the section 
responsible to develop a standardized disaster response information system and 
Interview GMLZ was conducted in the section responsible for the overall disaster 
situational picture.  
 
Table 1: Overview of the Interviewees 
 
With Interview THW we interviewed representatives from a Federal force provider and 
with Interview BRK a Bavarian force provider. Additionally we interviewed 
representatives from various political and administrative levels of the disaster response 
system in Bavaria. Figure 2 sketches the process of question development for interview 
preparation.  
We utilize three central models developed to guideline C2-transformation in military 
domain. These models are the Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework 
(NCO-CF) developed by Garstka and Alberts (2004), the Command and Control 
Approach Space (C2 Approach Space, see Alberts, 2007) and the NATO Network 
Enabled Capabilities Command & Control Maturity Model (N2C2M2 developed by 
SAS-065, 2009) all basing on the premise that only a networked approach is good 
enough to cope with future challenges. We derive working hypotheses from those 
models to understand which role the concepts relevant to the C2 system of military 
domain play in the disaster response domain. These working hypotheses were the basis 
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for interview question development. We identified topics and structured our questions 
accordingly. We link the questions to our three objects of interest (see Figure 2). For the 
full set of questions and a summary of the C2 models see Heumüller (2009). 
 
Figure 2: Models, Topics and Objects of Interest 
3 Results 
We firstly describe an overall organizational structure of the Bavarian disaster response 
system with its most important organizations and relationships. Secondly, we analyze 
the analogy between military domain and disaster response in the field of C2 in terms of 
models, scenarios and interpretation of organizational transformation. Thirdly, we 
analyse the interpretations of our interviewees to compare them with our findings 
regarding relevant C2 concepts. We then aggregate the C2 concepts and develop a 
conceptual model integrating the structural findings from law texts and regulations, the 
findings from the analogy between military and disaster response domain and the 
interpretations of our interviewees. The model describes influence factors on C2 
effectiveness in the German disaster response system. 
3.1 Bavarian Disaster Response System - Its Organizational Structure  
We model the organizational view (Figure 3) with regard to relevant German and 
Bavarian law texts and regulations (Grundgesetz, 2009, BayKSGH, 2009, THW-Gesetz, 
2009, Zivilschutzgesetz, 2009). Additionally, we triangulate our findings with a case 
study on the 2002 Elbe-Flood-Disaster (Richter et al., 2009) and our interviews.  
Organizational Structure – Static View 
Bavaria as federal state is self-governed responsible for disaster response operations in 
its area. The Bavarian disaster management law (BayKSGH, 2009) defines three 
hierarchically organized governmental levels of disaster management authority. These 
levels are from top to bottom at state level, regional level and county level (Figure 3, 
left blue/ dark boxes): 
? At county level the Lower Disaster Management Authority is primarily 
responsible for coping with physical effects of a disaster and coordinates disaster 
management units as e.g. fire fighters or medical response.  
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? The Middle Disaster Management Authority at regional level is superior to 
county level and is primarily responsible for force coordination and 
administrative and political management supporting subordinated counties.  
? The Higher Disaster Management Authority at state level collocated with the 
government of Bavaria and subordinated directly to the Bavarian Ministry of the 
Interior is primarily responsible for political management supporting its regions. 
The BBK (Figure 3, left blue/ dark box at federal level) - an agency of the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior – coordinate upon request by Bavaria large-scale disaster 
management operations in case other federal states are affected by disaster as well.  
The administrative and political management (Figure 3, left blue/ dark boxes) is 
responsible for disaster preparedness including disaster prevention, development of 
disaster plans and the evolution of disaster concepts, law texts and regulations. It 
supervises and coordinates disaster management trainings with force suppliers. In cases 
of disaster the disaster management authorities are responsible for force coordination 
for example force allocation, the information of people in affected areas about disaster 
development, interaction with media and coordination of public life. In daily business 
the disaster management authorities are small departments of about two people at 
county level to five at state level. During disasters these authorities constitute the core 
headquarters for disaster management operations. 
 
Figure 3: The Overall Organizational Structure of the Bavarian Disaster Response System 
 
The force providers responsible for coping with the disasters in the field are organized 
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in Bavarian organizations as fire fighting brigades and police2 and federal organizations 
as the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), the German Armed Forces 
(Bundeswehr) and the Federal Police. 
There are five major Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) supporting disaster 
response primarily due to medical rescue, care and all kinds of help necessary during 
disasters, depicted by Figure 3, triangles on the right side. These NGOs are the Bavarian 
Red Cross (BRK), the Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD), the Johanniter Unfallhilfe (JUH), 
the Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft (DLRG, responsible for water rescue) and 
the Arbeiter Samariter Bund (ASB). These NGOs have a similar organizational 
structure to optimize collaboration with disaster management authorities. All define a 
structure with three levels of responsibility at county, regional and state level according 
to the political management. Nearly all of the NGOs’ personnel are voluntary as a lot of 
fire fighters are as well. 
The Organization in Case of Disaster 
The Bavarian disaster law defines disaster as an event, endangering or harming life or 
health of a highly number of people, natural environment or significant material assets 
to a large extent when danger can only be prevented by the co-operation of public 
authorities, organizations and force providers under the management of disaster 
management authorities (BayKSGH, 2009, I (2)).  
To be able managing all assets to prevent from disaster development and protect people 
and nature according to the disaster definition, disaster management authorities found 
headquarters at every level of authority (Figure 3, green/ dark grey ellipses on the left). 
These headquarters consist of personnel from disaster management authorities as core 
staff, personnel from other departments of the respective level of government as e.g. 
social affairs or financial affairs and consultants or liaison officers from all major force 
supplier organizations. Consultants appointed by NGOs, THW and fire brigades provide 
information and advice regarding availability and competencies of their respective 
organization (Figure 3, red/ dark grey dashed lines). A liaison officer appointed by 
Police, Bundeswehr and Federal Police advises and additionally requests forces of the 
own organization supporting disaster managers3 (Figure 3, green/ light grey dashed 
lines). 
The administrative headquarters are organized as staff elements for the respective 
commander. Consultants and liaison officers work in staff-cells. When regular staff 
requires information the cells are integrated ad-hoc. Consultants and liaison officers are 
evaluated as highly important4 for disaster managers as they provide the knowledge 
necessary to coordinate forces to respond to disaster development.  
Laws and regulations describe how headquarters are established – who sends staff and 
who runs it. How is this process coordinated practically? This process is crucial for the 
overall disaster management operation as all forces suddenly will be coordinated by the 
political/ administrative headquarters. This process is relevant to understand the C2 
structure of the system. 
                                                 
2 Police forces can take over special disaster management tasks given by the disaster management 
authorities dependent on force capacity. Primarily Police has to handle their usual business, which is 
public security 
3 Source: Interview THW, Interview BRK 
4 Source: Interview Munich, Interview GMLZ, Interview Oberbayern 
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The leader of the first responders on the spot, typically a fire fighter, becomes incident 
commander (ICmdr). He establishes an incident command (IC5) and reports to the 
administrative superior at county’s Lower Disaster Management Authorities. When an 
ICmdr, capable to estimate disaster’s extent, recommends establishing an administrative 
headquarters, the administrative manager usually follows and establishes the political/ 
administrative headquarters at county level and informs superior levels of authority. 
With more than one critical spot more ICmdrs become responsible and manage 
respective units, always reporting to administrative headquarters. With more than one 
county affected the regional headquarters will be established and so on. Thus, the 
headquarters are established from bottom to top. The required time until a headquarters 
at state level is fully operational can take several days (Kirchbach et al., 2002).  
As Figure 3 depicts, the ICmdr is leader and superior to fire brigade, NGO and THW 
units. He is not superior to Police, Bundeswehr and federal police units although he 
coordinates their missions due to direct communication with their commanders typically 
in the IC. Latter units remain in their chain of command. Accordingly, the units of fire 
brigades, NGOs and THW shift command with the result that its superior headquarters 
is responsible only for coordination purposes as allocation of resources (see Figure 3, 
blue/ light grey ellipses and light arrows). The ICmdr becomes full commander 
implying that unit’s organization has no further access to the unit until the operation 
terminates6. Thus, operational headquarters of fire brigades, NGOs and THW only 
coordinate tasks insofar as they allocate units for tasks, advise political leaders and 
superiors and manage information. On the contrary, operational headquarters of police, 
Bundeswehr and federal police are fully operational and manage their own units and 
coordinate with ICmdr. This short description of command chains, assignments, 
responsibilities and headquarters allocation clarifies how complex the disaster response 
system is and which central value C2 has. 
Findings 
1) All disaster management organizations are hierarchically structured. 
 Force providers are structured according to the political structure with three 
levels of responsibility in Bavaria. This uniformity of structure enables, that all 
responsible managers can communicate on their level of responsibility (county, 
region, state). Thus, fast and clearly structured information exchange is possible.  
2) Many units from fire fighters, NGOs and THW shift their command structure in 
case of disaster. 
 The respective ICmdr is responsible for tactical operations in the field. He fully 
commands fire fighters, NGOs and THW units. Unity of command7 is design 
principle (Taylor, 1911; Pearce and Conger, 2003). The ICmdr but also political 
leaders in the administrative headquarters are focused leaders (Rost, 1993; 
Stewart and Manz, 1995) – second design principle. 
3) Political/ Administrative headquarters consist of disaster managers, managers of 
other political areas and liaison elements – consultants and liaison officers. 
                                                 
5 The ICmdr is responsible to command and control operations on a small regional area. The IC serves as 
his staff to support coordination, planning and communicating orders.  
6 Source: Interview THW 
7 Unity of command means that only one superior at time exists. Matrix organizations or networks are 
different designs. 
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 Due to the assembly of people with different competencies from political areas 
and force suppliers the headquarters become highly interdependent (Gronn, 
2002), prerequisite for managing complex missions. 
 
Figure 4: C2 System Concepts - Structure 
With regard to the organizational structure of the disaster response system we consider 
three concepts significantly influencing C2 effectiveness; 1) C2 effectiveness of each 
hierarchically structured organization, 2) effectiveness of the system of liaison elements 
and 3) C2 effectiveness of Political/ Administrative headquarters (Figure 4). All three 
concepts interact as hierarchically structured organizations send personnel as liaison 
elements, which is adequately trained, motivated and effective, or not. Liaison elements 
complement Political/ Administrative headquarters and support C2 effectiveness of 
these headquarters. The headquarters command and control the hierarchically organized 
organizations during disaster missions. Hierarchical organizations’ C2 effectiveness is 
moderated by uniformity of structure as it supports C2 effectiveness. Unity of command 
and focused leadership are design principles moderating the whole hierarchy-design-
approach and thus the relationship with overall C2 effectiveness (Figure 4).  
3.2 The Analogy between Military and Disaster Response Domain 
We argue that an analogy between military domain and disaster response exists. 
Furthermore it is promising to analyze modern C2 models and its concepts. Holyoak 
and Thagard, 1996 argue that analogy means the existence of structural parallels 
between base domain (military) and target domain (disaster response). When this 
existence is evident, the assertion that a relational structure observable in base domain 
can be applied to target domain is sound (Gentner, 1983).  
Table 2 depicts strategic ideas of both, military and disaster response domain in column 
one and two. The strategic ideas are derived from official German strategy papers 
published in the Federal Ministry of Defence (military domain) and the Federal Ministry 
of the Interior (disaster response domain)8. These ideas are abstracted to C2 relevant 
concepts in column three of Table 2. 
The three C2 relevant models NCO-CF, C2 Approach Space and N2C2M2, all 
developed in the military domain and mentioned in section 2 rely on the assumption of 
high (and increasing) mission complexity due to new scenarios as e.g. asymmetric 
                                                 
8 The most important resources of analysis are BMVg (2006b) - the white book of Germany, BMVg 
(2004) - the strategic guideline of the Bundeswehr and BMI (2009) - the guideline for modern civil 
protection. 
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threats, the increasing influence of mass media and missions in urban terrain. Exactly 
the same characteristics of missions exist in modern disaster management. The military 
models support transformational strategies for military organizations implying that a 
network C2 approach can handle new challenges best. This so-called net-centricity is 
highlighted in the strategic papers for both domains. The key resource of today’s 
missions is information as is prerequisite for plans and decisions. Faster and richer 
information exchange is key for operational tempo (Alberts, 2007). 
 
Table 2: Similarities between Military and Disaster Response Domain 
 
Findings: 
1) Military and disaster response domain are analogous w.r.t. C2 concepts (Table 
2). 
2) Increasing mission complexity due to new scenarios is the underlying 
assumption in both domains. 
3) Transformation is a strategically defined change process and necessary to enable 
disaster response coping successfully with future challenges. 
4) Net-centricity – a robust network structure of all security-relevant organizations 
in military and disaster response domain – the so-called whole-of-government 
approach – is one key goal of Transformation.  
5) Information is one explicitly highlighted resource for modern operations and 
information exchange crucial for operational success. 
3.3 Conceptual C2 Factors Influencing Disaster Response C2 
Effectiveness 
We were interested in our interviewees’ interpretations of the concepts of Table 2. We 
analyzed 1) whether our concepts are relevant to the interviewees’ organization and 2) 
whether more C2 relevant concepts exist in the interviewees’ interpretations and 3) 
which relationships exist between these grounded concepts.  
Scenarios. Increasing mission complexity due to change of scenarios in scale and 
diversity is the central challenge formulated by the strategic concepts of military and 
disaster response domain (BMVg, 2006b; BMI, 2009). These new scenarios are 
discussed within all interviewed organizations and interviews document that these 
scenarios play a major role in planning, training and preparation (see Figure 5, row 
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Scenarios). Only the representative from BRK stated that new scenarios play minor role 
for BRK, as BRK has to organize first aid and care for injured or evacuated people 
however the scenario looks like. The interviewee explained that the scale of disaster is 
more important for BRK and new scenarios often imply more injured people and larger 
disaster extent. The disaster response system is not responsible for new scenarios. It is 
sound to think of scenarios as external factors with regard to the disaster response 
system’s artificially defined mental boundary. The system has to cope with the impacts 
of these new scenarios as terrorist attacks or disasters caused by migration or climate 
change. 
 
Figure 5: Interview-Codings w.r.t the Grounded Concepts9 
 
Transformation. New scenarios imply a pressure to transform for organizations. 
However, the interviewees perceive the concept Transformation, differently (Figure 5, 
row Transformation). The strategic level represented by the BBK10 define a distinct 
process named Transformation (as in the Bundeswehr) to clarify the strategic impact 
and the disruptive change for the disaster management system (BMI, 2009). The 
representatives from operational and tactical levels accept the need of adaption and 
change but in a more incremental way. They focus to a lesser extent overall 
organizational issues but more coordinative issues at tactical level. For example to 
foster a better coordination between BRK and the medical service of the Bundeswehr 
due to more mutual training is one special aspect of change relevant for 201011. This 
reorganization includes communication, coordination and collaboration processes at 
tactical level in the field in special tasks like pitching a large tent for injured people.  
                                                 
9 The rectangles under legend stand for abstact representations of the interviewees statements w.r.t. the 
respective concept. Thus, same colour represents statement conformity between interviewees. 
10 Source: Interview BBK, Interview deNIS, Interview GMLZ 
11 Source: Interview BRK 
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Political Will. Our interviewees call for strong political will manifesting in precise 
organizational goals. All interview partners expect that the strategic political 
management define precisely how to transform the disaster management system. As 
long as Transformation as process remains unsupported by clear models how to 
transform, the responsible personnel are not able to bring this process to life. As due to 
the new scenarios as concrete challenges the idea of Transformation was born, this 
process is not an end in itself. Thus, new scenarios of course impact political will 
insofar as the pressure to act for political managers significantly increase when new 
scenarios bring the disaster response system to shortfall. Thus we think, that political 
will is also an external factor for the disaster management system, like new scenarios 
are. 
Structure (Hierarchical Organization C2 Effectiveness; Liaison Elements Effectiveness; 
Political/ Administrative Headquarters Effectiveness). As discussed in section 0 we 
consider three concepts influencing overall C2 effectiveness significantly; 1) the C2 
effectiveness of each hierarchically structured organization, 2) the effectiveness of the 
system of liaison elements and 3) the C2 effectiveness of political/ administrative 
headquarters. All disaster response organizations are hierarchically organized with 
explicitly defined reporting chains and standardized communication acts manifested in 
several reporting forms for e.g. resource requests or mission orders12. We asked, 
whether inter-organizational communication barriers are an issue. The representative of 
THW denied and described the approach that external organizations requesting THW 
forces do not have to matter who within THW is the right addressee for the request. It is 
task of THW to organize, that the request is passed to right level and person of 
responsibility13. Our interview partner describes that as an “one face to the customer” 
approach to eliminate barriers as much as possible for external requester. The interviews 
confirmed support for hierarchical organization designs, notwithstanding the importance 
of barrier-free inter-organizational networking (see Figure 5).  
Net-Centricity. Increasing mission complexity due to new scenarios requires new 
management approaches. One central idea is networking. The so-called net-centricity is 
defined as strategic design approach for Bundeswehr (BMVg, 2004) and disaster 
management (BMI, 2009). All interviewees consider net-centricity as prerequisite for 
solving complex disaster scenarios, having high value for disaster management. They 
all accept and support the idea of whole-of-government approaches describing 
governmental, non-governmental, profit and non-profit organizations working together 
closely in network coalitions to cope with future disasters. The representative from 
BRK argues, that networking, as basis for collaboration is even more important between 
organizations with similar functions as e.g. BRK and JUH. However, this perception 
expresses relatively low levels of task-interdependence (Wageman, 1995) between 
BRK-functions and functions of others (e.g. THW). The representatives involved in 
overall mission planning highlight the necessity to closely work together in 
collaborations14. New scenarios increase their task interdependence. E.g. the power 
breakdown scenario illustrates how much functionality relies on power supply. Each 
player in the urban network of the city of Munich has to be incorporated in planning to 
cope with a power breakdown. 
Social Networks/ Trust. The strategic visions calling for net-centricity (BMVg, 2006b; 
BMI, 2009) left open how these networks should be organized or which nodes and 
relations these networks establish. Our interviewees emphasized the importance and 
                                                 
12 Source: Interview THW, Interview Munich 
13 Source: Interview THW 
14 Source: Interview Munich, Interview BRK, Interview GMLZ, Interview THW 
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necessity of personal networks within and across their respective hierarchies to increase 
C2 effectiveness within and across the organization (findings of 0). These “small” 
networks help establishing networks between the disaster management organizations 
and take over a mediation function between hierarchies and net-centricity. Our Bavarian 
interview partners participate in a “disaster round table” which is conducted on a regular 
basis in a Bavarian pub. These meetings give room to talking, discussing problems and 
playing cards and are evaluated by all Bavarian interview partners15 as being strongly 
beneficial for establishing social networks and trust. Directly asked, several 
representatives stated that it would be a strong disadvantage for young leaders not 
having a solid social network within the disaster management organizations16. 
Information Exchange. The main intent to build up networks is to enable the required 
information exchange between organizations engaged in disaster management. 
Information is an increasing successes factor in today’s missions either in military or 
disaster management (BMVg, 2004; BMI, 2009). The functional (task), planning 
(process) and outcome interdependence (Wageman, 1995; Langfred, 2005) between and 
within organizations in missions is a critical influence factor requiring coordination 
(Gronn, 2002). In highly dynamic environments like disaster response operations 
information is fast aging. This requires permanent information exchange implying the 
ability (organizational rules, technical infrastructure) and will (cultural and 
organizational rules) to exchange information for planning and coordination purposes. 
Our interviewees’ interpretation on information exchange seems to be heterogeneous 
(Figure 5, row Information Exchange Intensity). The Interview BBK did not bear the 
concept of information exchange explicitly. The Interview deNIS clarified the view that 
deNIS as information system offers a service for disaster management at state level. The 
IT of deNIS implements the concept that information is offered voluntarily as all 
participants accept the requirement and advantage of information exchange. Interview 
partners from force providers and operational and tactical level are aware of the 
necessity to share information inter-organizationally as barrier-free as possible, albeit 
within all organizations information exchange and reporting is explicitly regulated. 
Situational Picture. A situational picture informs commander and staff about what is 
going on in the field. Usually it allocates tactical units represented by symbols (e.g. one 
platoon fire fighters) and its mission plus time estimation (e.g. moving from A to B in 
30 min) on a map. The situational picture17 is really important for headquarters to be 
aware which units are engaged or which are ready for new orders. An illustration – in 
large-scale disasters the number and units of respondents become overwhelming. For 
example more than 100.000 responders helped during the 2002 Elbe-Flood-Disaster 
(Richter et al., 2009).  Information exchange is crucial for establishing situational 
pictures. The management of an inter-organizational valid situational picture is one of 
the major challenges in military domain (BMVg, 2006a). The importance of a valid 
situational picture and the costs, if such a picture lacks is reported in Kirchbach et al., 
2002 for the Elbe-Flood-Disaster. All interviewees emphasized the importance of a 
coherent and valid situational picture for disaster response operations and confirm that 
their organizations are willing to allocate required information barrier-free to enable the 
whole system to operate well.  
Shared Awareness. Shared Awareness captures how and in which stages and phases 
organizational members assess their situational environment and negotiate knowledge 
                                                 
15 Source: Interview BBK, Interview THW, Interview Oberbayern, Interview Munich 
16 Source: Interview BRK, Interview THW 
17 In this paper we emphasize the artefact of this picture whether on a physical map or technically 
represented. We do not mean the cognitive picture, shared between e.g. commander and staff. 
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about the situation, for example in missions (Nofi, 2000). Shared Awareness 
conceptualizes overlaps in members’ individual knowledge and information about the 
situation and the difference in interpretation. These overlaps enable shared planning and 
discussing future courses of action in missions. Shared Awareness is assessed as one of 
the key antecedents for success in complex missions (Nofi, 2000; Richter and Lechner, 
2009). This concept was not grounded in our interviews, it stems from the most 
prominent models in the field (Alberts and Hayes, 2003; Garstka and Alberts, 2004). 
Information exchange and situational pictures do have to be integrated in plans and 
courses of actions. The concept of shared awareness explains as cognitive model, how 
exchanged information in the end influence C2 effectiveness. The mutual cognitive 
shared situational picture as concept named shared awareness is basis for shared 
planning. 
3.4 A Conceptual Model Aggregating Influence Factors on C2 
Effectiveness in German Disaster Response 
We analyzed different concepts, influencing the overall C2 effectiveness of the German 
disaster response system. The result – the concepts and their relationships – is 
aggregated by the model as depicted by Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: External Factors, Structure and Information as Determinants of C2 Effectiveness - a 
Conceptual Model 
 
External factors – new scenarios in combination with political will – require a strategic 
transformational process of change. One major goal of that change process is the 
restructuring of the disaster response system as a whole. Net-centricity seems to be the 
future structural concept. Social networks and trust between representatives of all 
organizations mediate the structure of system of hierarchies and net-centricity. The idea 
of net-centricity is to enable organizations to exchange information as fluid as possible. 
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Transformation revaluates the impact of information in modern missions. Information is 
key-enabler of planning and integrating all means and assets of the overall disaster 
response system. External factors, structure and information as overarching concepts 
influence C2 effectiveness. The fit and balanced mix of all three is crucial for high C2 
effectiveness.   
4 Discussion & Future Developments 
We modelled concepts influencing C2 effectiveness in the disaster response domain in 
Germany. We identified our concepts in 1) literature and primarily strategic planning 
guidelines of the domain, 2) military conceptual C2 models as the analogy with the 
military and the disaster response domain is helpful and 3) interviews conducted with 
representatives from major disaster response organizations.  
Our model can help disaster response managers to identify leverage points to increase 
overall C2 effectiveness. Does the organization reflect new scenarios adequately and is 
the political will to cope with these scenarios the right way strong enough? Is the 
structure and effectiveness of the organization adequate? How can transformation be 
supported? Are information exchange processes within the organization and across 
sound for complex missions? How and in which ways does the organizational structure 
with its cultural and organizational impacts impede information flows? To raise and 
answer these questions help to diagnose the organizational fit for future and complex 
scenarios for disaster response managers w.r.t. C2 effectiveness.  
Understanding modern C2 approaches for future disaster response scenarios is crucial 
and the proposed model can help to enable understanding. Future research should 
highlight the role of leadership approach in the overall disaster response system as 
hierarchies and focused leadership seem to fit but shared leadership fits better with 
networks (Gronn, 2002; Pearce and Conger, 2003). Here empirical research is the next 
step.  
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